Sieyes and Necker are our two basic poles within the spectrum of constitutional government. Solutions lying outside this range are either arbitrary despotism or simple mass fury. But, in the opinion of the Liberals, the one man's system leads to freedom and security while the other's degenerates into chaos and fear.
Essentially the doctrine of Sieyes was a bowdlerized Rousseau, plus representative government. Two of his points deserve our particular attention. The first is that the institution of hereditary nobility is excess and worthless baggage for the French nation to carry; the Tiers, in fact, is the Nation:
It is not enough to have shown that the Privileged Class, far from being useful to the Nation, can only weaken and harm it; we must further prove that the noble order has no part in the social organization; that it may well be a burden for the Nation since it cannot be part of it.7
The only hope for the nobility in France, in the eyes of Sieyes, is "their rehabilitation in the order of the Tiers Etat." 8 All special corporations of citizens must be abolished so that "the common interest is assured of dominating the particular interests"; the duty of the Nation is to see that it does not "degenerate into aristocracy." 9 As a corollary to the thesis of Sieyes, all "mixed government" becomes literally impossible: the monarch is no more than a symbol of the people's power, and all conceivable aristocracies are abolished. This leads Sieyes to attack the much vaunted freedom of England. The English constitution, perhaps of some merit in 1688, is gothic and arbitrary by the standards of a hundred years later. It is the "product of chance and circumstances much more than of enlightenment." 10
The second line of argument is more complicated and more interesting. Here the customarily abstract Sieyes turns to history-the history of Dubos and Voltaire-for his most crushing indictment of the nobility. By this thesis, the opposite of that of Boulainvilliers and Montesquieu, the "noble Germans" are usurpers who have held the French people in illicit bondage ever since late Roman times. The Gauls are the Tiers Etat:
Why should [the Tiers] not send back to the Franconian forests all those families who preserve the mad pretension of descent from the Conquerors and inheritance of their rights?
Thus purged, the Nation will, I think, take consolation in being left to believe that it is composed only of the descendants of the Gauls and the Romans.... Why not? Turn about is fair play; the Tiers will once again be Noble in becoming the Conquering Race in its turn! 11 7Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers Etat? (2nd edition, Paris, 1789), 8.
s8Ibid., 14. 9Ibid., 118. 10 Ibid., 68.
11 Ibid., 12-13.
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Curiously enough, the conservative doctrinaires led by Guizot will pick up and expand the radical historical arguments of Sieyes, altering the Tiers Etat to fit the bourgeoisie of their heart's desire; whereas the independent Liberals will at least waveringly credit their Montesquieu.
Jacques Necker, the man of a thousand virtues and pieties, loved with a fierce filial devotion by Madame de Stael, lauded by Constant, hailed by almost all the moderates, was above all an admirer of the English constitution and of the biases of that freedom-loving and commercial island. His system had consisted in making the customs, politics, and constitution of France as much like those of England as possible, while time remained. This meant, in sum, the antithesis of the Sieyesian doctrine: cultivation of a responsible aristocracy, primogeniture, a bicameral legislature, and mixed government a la Montesquieu, decentralization of administrative responsibility in the provinces and a constitutional monarch who would not be without power. The Anglomania of the Neckers leaves no doubt.12 But the Neckers' fancy did not of itself create the total idee fixe of Restoration Liberalism. It was the violent elimination of all other constitutional solutions-except the English, which had never been triedthat gave the "beau systeme" of Montesquieu 3 an air of finality and perfection in the eyes of the amis de la liberte.
According to the Liberals, 1791 had taught that no king could survive without the support of hereditary aristocracy. In 1814 France had both a king and a nobility which, despite its countless duplicities and stupidities, had been redeemed by force. The extraordinary Liberal attempt will be to find a place for this institution within the system of liberty, treating it not merely as a necessary evil but as an additional barrier to arbitrary power. It is not without some inconvenience that the Liberals make the gesture; but the idea is, in the words of Dominique Bagge, to create a "liberalisme assez heredi12To take a non-political instance: Madame Necker languished hopelessly in love with a wayward Edward Gibbon for a number of years before accepting Jacques; it was seriously proposed that Madame de Stael is Protestant in background, and so is Constant. This is incalculably important, not simply because it places her genetically in the tradition of modern revolution and "cosmopolitanizes" her r6le-attaching her to the Reformation in Germany, and above all, to the Glorious Revolution of 1688-but because it symbolizes her whole psychological position in the liberal movement. She is intelligent, wealthy, independent, and free-with the candle of the Lord in her soul, when she cares to light it, and money in the bank. Furthermore, her God (and Benjamin's) can become at whim an immanent conscience a la Rousseau, a rationalist teleological deity, or a Kantian metaphor that makes liberty immortal; none of the dark, secularized Calvinism of Guizot in her politics, none of the Catholic subordination or dogmatism, either. Instead, a sense that Protestantism, free of consistency and free of priestcraft, taken up or put down at will like a book of poetry, might be a good state religion for France; a sense that Protestantism is ancient and Catholicism modern.
Then there is class. Necker, despite his thousand generosities, is, by dint of birth, an exceedingly rich bourgeois, and his daughter has made a noble "marriage." Consequently, the civil rights of the aristocracy becomes the more tender as Revolutionary France explodes. So far we have seen that hereditary aristocracy is an obligatory accompaniment to constitutional monarchy, and that this is the free type of European government par excellence, with England, graced by "a hundred and twenty years of social perfectioning," 29 as the warrant for its success. "What especially characterizes England is the mixture of the chivalric spirit with enthusiasm for liberty, the two most noble feelings of which the human heart is capable." 30 Moreover, "the principal reason for liberty in England is that deliberation took place in two chambers, and not in three." 31 In England, happily, the mass is "bien reglee." 32 The English aristocracy is responsible and progressive and even participates wholeheartedly in those charitable associations in which Tocqueville, writing of America, will later perceive a substitute for aristocracy itself.33 English liberty is not just a passing accident, good in its time, but the cornerstone for all reasonable advance: ". . . after a century of lasting institutions which have formed the most religious, moral, and enlightened nation of which Europe can boast, I could not conceive how the prosperity of the country, that is to say, its liberty, could ever be menaced." 34 The trick, and for Madame de Stael the whole trick, is to make this work in France, which, "of all modern monarchies ... is certainly the one whose political institutions have been the most arbitrary and variable." 35 The peerage will be for her the laboratory of eclat, character-building, and example.
The emigres in London think
Both theoretical and practical considerations enter into her prefer- ence. In theory, the "heredite modifiee" can become an agency of liberty, since without it no triple separation of powers is possible. In practice, the peerage can combine the "ancient souvenirs of chivalry" and the modern concerns of merit, and in so doing purge the wastrels and parvenus of the aristocracy who belong neither to the great families nor to the nobility of intelligence and achievement. Madame de Stael has an insatiable contempt for everything aristocratic that is not ancient or meritorious. We see this in her description of the Old Regime: "The nobility of the province was still more inflexible than the grands seigneurs ... all these gentilshommes, whose titles were known only to themselves, perceived that they might lose distinctions for which no one any longer had any respect." 36 On the other hand, "a privileged body of any sort holds its patent only from history. Finally, the de Staelian scheme, in all its English grandeur, emerges: fixity and change will meet, tradition and merit will be wedded, the lion and the lamb will lie down together. "You may, I repeat, associate new names with ancient ones, but the color of the past must melt into the present." 44 But-after such knowledge, what forgiveness? One of the virtues of a moderate constitution and free government is that it allows you to forget what you cannot absolve, but to learn through memory and comparison the ways of action that lie within your power. "The past is no longer ours; but let us be permitted to draw from it the lessons needed against attempts at new injustices." 50 Lanjuinais has lived with and through all manner of injustices; for him, if the Restoration can be applied with balance and measure, it will represent a vast breathing space. So he goes to French history in order to breathe and to establish a stable present, in his survey of the Constitutions de la Nation franyaise. The mot-clef is "reasonable liberty" and Lanjuinais finds the proper guarantees for this quality in the Charte, if it can be applied in the spirit of Montesquieu:
We recognize there the measure of liberty reasonably desirable in an old civilization, after centuries of despotism and so many intervals of anarchy, after thirty years of public disturbance and so many crimes committed in the name of liberal doctrines but in the interest of servile doctrines.51 Does this, as with Madame de Stael, mean an intermittent praise of "great families" and the "spirit of chivalry"? Obviously not, given Lanjuinais's penchant: "The feudal government was only a chaos of anarchy and despotism." 52 Still, Lanjuinais assigns to hereditary aristocracy "special attributes" 53 and in a much muted way-because his cosmopolitanism is second-hand-he accepts the Anglophile critique of French institutions. In 1789 "without claiming to imitate North America, one envied the private and public liberties of the English, and one desired to acquire them as much as an old civilization could permit." 54 Lanjuinais, in short, is not impressed with the lineage, virtues, and eclat of the French hereditary institution-he believes it guilty of countless sins-but he is convinced that history has made it an overpowering national reality which cannot be ignored, and must therefore be transformed. The power of history to create habits, the compulsion of the abstract arguments for mixed government, the physical fact of the Bourbon Restoration-with the undoubted observation that a Chamber of Peers might be a barrier against future "chambres introuvables" 55-his own merited possession of a new aristocratic title: these are the four criteria to which Lanjuinais repairs for the defense of aristocracy.
Let us see first of all what lessons he draws from his sketch of constitutional history. First of all, there is little or no "class argument" of Franks and Gauls a la Guizot: Lanjuinais will not assimilate "the chaos of centuries of ignorance and fanaticism" to a single mechanical synthesis. In fact, Lanjuinais's liberty is as ancient as Madame de Stael's and Montesquieu's: it has merely proceeded in a more interrupted and less optimistic fashion. The earliest Franks Noble rank is then, according to Lanjuinais, a condition of political merit; proceeding from the monarch down, it is the source and guarantee of order, hierarchy, and mixed government: in paraphrase of Constant, it allows a free society to operate in the sphere which is neither the power of a single man nor of the scaffold. At the same time, by the definition of a peerage, its members represent the nation and not the nobility; the law is above them, ignoring their antecedent rights, and what the law has granted, the law can surely remove.
Benjamin Constant: Dedoublement Aristocratique "His character," wrote Talleyrand to Bonaparte, "is firm and moderate, his views unhesitatingly Republican and liberal." 63 Sorry as we are to contradict the judgment of a bel esprit, contradict we must; and the last adjective alone will suffice, the others being not even controversial. Benjamin Constant, while incontrovertibly liberal, is really no more republican than is the "Republic of letters," and yet he has three forms of doubt about aristocracy which will pursue him, according to circumstances, to his grave. The first is a product of intellectual bias: abstract, metaphysical, and Protestant; it is often also a pose-the pose of a man who delights to celebrate the bucolic feasts of the Directoire among his peasants and play at being a fructidorian Roman. Constant calls this fanciful republicanism "common sense" (as opposed to experience), and we shall let it pass.
The second doubt is derived from Constant's view of French history. After all the notorious indiscretions of the hereditary nobleshistory furnishes the catalogue-how is it possible for them to be reborn, like a tired Phoenix, when the Revolution is "won"? It is a wonder that they have the audacity to be there. He relents, however: there may be a necessity for their being there. He will force a Chamber of Peers on Napoleon during the Cent-Jours.
Finally, there is doubt in the form of prediction. Constant sees a future, one which our other liberals dying earlier and fatigued by the labors of the past, have not speculated on. In England Madame de Stael has seen prosperity and the perpetuity of free institutions, with commerce entering the aristocracy at a proper rate. Constant, confining his gaze to France, notices industry (of infant proportions) and industrial property growing, a society transforming itself from its earlier roots in feudal and landed holdings-roots very much shaken, besides, by a Revolution that created 2,000,000 new property owners. Moreover, these very changes mean to him increased liberty-at moments they seem to guarantee the impossibility of usurpation (we now know better), the difficulty of arbitraire (one can send his property abroad in currency before the slow-footed despot can confiscate it), the disutility of aggressive war, which destroys more than it can ever seize.64 The march of history has made these things inevitable: "Up to a certain point, the warlike aristocracy counterbalanced the power of the priests just as the despotism of kings later dethroned the military aristocracy and as today industry is upsetting the royal despotism. and extends liberty-a liberty which, though its components may be separable (religion, press, property, justice, etc.), is basically indivisible and the work of the spirit. The absolute of liberty is guarded by a host of devices which, like property, are themselves less than absolute, "useful social conventions." Constant's bitterest attacks on the French hereditary nobility are contained in the Memoires sur les Cent-Jours, and his most sympathetic defense of this institution is in the Principes de politique. This suggests that he bears the nobles a heavy grudge when he is personally and emotionally involved, but that his wrath subsides when he withdraws to the Olympian calm of political theory. Let us, first of all, follow the diatribe of the Cent-Jours. In the extensive note entitled "De la haine contre la noblesse lors du retour de Bonaparte en 1815," Constant is engaged in showing that the unpopularity of the nobility in the country aided powerfully in making Napoleon's return popular.67 He repairs to the nuit des temps to commence his argument. And, quite unlike Madame de Stael and Lanjuinais, he borrows, with generous acknowledgement, M. Guizot's millenial strife of Franks and Gauls. We seem about to hear Voltaire speaking in the following passage: "The least acquaintance with history is enough to convince us that the civilized peoples of the Roman Empire having been enslaved by the barbarian hordes of the North, the calamities of that subjugation and the memories of those calamities established a fundamental difference between the doctrines of ancient and modern political writers on the organization of societies." 68 Constant's argument now becomes extremely subtle, however; for his purpose is not to prove that the Tiers is the Nation, like Sieyes, or to legitimize middle-class power, like Guizot, but rather to explain why the proper principles of aristocracy, praised by Aristotle, have never functioned in modern Europe. "Among the ancients the nobles were a class of compatriots who had gained wealth or a superior consideration because their ancestors had deserved well of the emerging society," but "among the moderns, inequality of rank had the most revolting origin of all, conquest." An exceedingly vigorous passage on the atrocities of the Middle Ages follows this observation. Does all this then mean that the entire fabric of illegitimacy must be unwoven so that the nation can come into its kingdom, a la Sieyess?
